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Abstract
Collaborative crowdsourcing has become a popular approach
to organizing work across the globe. Being global also means
being vulnerable to shocks – unforeseen events that disrupt
crowds – that originate from any country. In this study, we
examine changes in collaborative behavior of editors of Chi-
nese Wikipedia that arise due to the 2005 government censor-
ship in mainland China. Using the exogenous variation in the
fraction of editors blocked across different articles due to the
censorship, we examine the impact of reduction in group size,
which we denote as the shock level, on three collaborative be-
havior measures: volume of activity, centralization, and con-
flict. We find that activity and conflict drop on articles that
face a shock, whereas centralization increases. The impact of
a shock on activity increases with shock level, whereas the
impact on centralization and conflict is higher for moderate
shock levels than for very small or very high shock levels.
These findings provide support for threat rigidity theory –
originally introduced in the organizational theory literature
– in the context of large-scale collaborative crowds.
Introduction
Crowdsourcing is now poised to fundamentally transform
the way we coordinate work (Anya 2015). Online collabo-
rative crowdsourcing platforms such as Wikipedia present
a unique opportunity to tackle complex problems (Baldwin
and Von Hippel 2010; Yu and Nickerson 2011). Shocks are
unforeseen events that can disrupt and even threaten crowds
(Cohendet and Simon 2016; Jackson and Dutton 1988;
Ocasio 2011; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). Exam-
ples of such shocks include massive influxes or outflows
of members, platform or government policies, or exogenous
events (like the death of a celebrity) that increase the impor-
tance and visibility of the crowd’s work.
A number of studies have explored shocks and threats
in organizations (Cohendet and Simon 2016; Dutton et
al. 2006; Romero, Uzzi, and Kleinberg 2016) as well as
in small groups through experimental approaches (Argote,
Turner, and Fichman 1989; Gladstein and Reilly 1985;
Harrington, Lemak, and Kendall 2002). However, less is
known about how shocks affect online crowds, which of-
ten face distinct challenges to effectively respond to shocks
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(Robert and Romero 2016; Kittur and Kraut 2010). For ex-
ample, online crowds have a much more fluid membership
than offline groups and organizations, which makes a poten-
tial response to an unexpected shock much more difficult to
organize. Therefore, a shock is likely to have a different im-
pact on online crowds than their organizational work group
counterparts. It is not clear how, or whether, online crowds
respond to a shock. Part of the reason for this gap in the liter-
ature is the lack of adequate instances where the same type
of shock affects a large number of online crowds – a phe-
nomenon that would allow for a systematic analysis of how
crowds typically respond to shocks.
In this paper, we take a step to fill this knowledge gap by
examining the impact of the 2005 Chinese government cen-
sorship block of Chinese Wikipedia. This event presents an
exogenous shock to all Wikipedia articles that have contrib-
utors from mainland China, because these articles lose some
and in some cases most of their contributors as a result of
the censorship block. Using the exogenous variation in the
fraction of editors blocked across different articles, we in-
vestigate the impact of shocks of different magnitudes on
articles with varying numbers of editors.
How do we expect the Chinese Wikipedia community to
respond to this censorship shock? The literature on threat
rigidity suggests that groups respond to an external threat
or shock by centralizing their decision-making and decreas-
ing internal conflict (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981).
Should we expect Chinese Wikipedia crowds to behave like
traditional offline groups? Our study aims to answer this
question. We examine the crowds’ response to shocks with
respect to three collaborative behavior measures: activity,
centralization, and conflict.
Our main contributions are the following: (i) We find that
the overall activity level drops after a shock, but the exact
drop in activity depends on the crowd’s size; (ii) as predicted
by thread rigidity theory, centralization increases and con-
flict decreases when crowds are faced with moderate shocks.
But surprisingly, the effects are less profound for more se-
vere shocks; (iii) our findings contribute to the organiza-
tion theory literature by providing a large-scale validation
of threat rigidity in a new emerging context; (iv) our find-
ings contribute to the crowdsourcing literature by providing
analysis that could have important implications to the design
and management of crowdsourcing platforms.
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Related Work
Threat Rigidity and Centralization: Threat rigidity is of-
ten used to explain how groups behave when faced with
an external shock (Kamphuis, Gaillard, and Vogelaar 2011;
Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). This theory suggests
that groups will seek to overcome external threats by in-
creasing both the centralization of decision-making and
group cohesion (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). Cen-
tralization helps the group better coordinate its response
to the threat during a time when coordination is difficult
(Cohendet and Simon 2016). Centralization also makes the
group more efficient by leveraging its existing work prac-
tices while resources are low (Argote, Turner, and Fichman
1989). Increases in cohesion reduce conflict (Windeler et al.
2015), which further facilitates coordination (Hinds and Bai-
ley 2003; Cummings, Espinosa, and Pickering 2009). Both
increases in centralization and decreases in conflict allow the
group to focus more on responding to the threat.
Threat rigidity has been found to be consistent with be-
haviors observed in organizations (Cohendet and Simon
2016; Dutton et al. 2006) but less so in experimental studies
of groups (Gladstein and Reilly 1985; Harrington, Lemak,
and Kendall 2002; Kamphuis, Gaillard, and Vogelaar 2011).
Other experimental studies found no evidence of central-
ization under threat (Argote, Turner, and Fichman 1989;
Driskell and Salas 1991).
There are several gaps in the current literature, which
our study aims to fill. One, in the previously mentioned
studies, due to the experimental methods employed, all
threats were artificial. Our crowds are faced with a real
external threat that could undermine their long term via-
bility. Two, previous studies employed ad-hoc groups of
people who had never worked together. Threats may not
have much of an impact when members have no real his-
tory or future with their group. We overcome this limita-
tion by examining crowds with both a history and a poten-
tial long term future. Three, group sizes have had little or
no variance. This is particularly problematic given that pre-
vious research on crowds has shown that size is often re-
lated to both centralization and conflict (Arazy et al. 2011;
Kittur and Kraut 2008). We study crowds of different sizes
which allows us to examine the interaction of crowd size and
the effect of the shock on collaborative dynamics. Four, past
studies examined the short-term impact of shocks on groups.
Thus, even when these findings show a link between shocks
and centralization it is difficult to know if such effects are
lasting. In our study, we examined the impacts of shocks
over a much longer period – 1 year. Finally, other studies do
not vary the intensity of the shock. Groups were either ex-
posed to a shock or not exposed. In natural settings, shocks
are likely to vary in intensity. In this study, shocks greatly
vary in intensity, which allows us to examine their impacts
over a range of levels.
Conflict and Crowds: Coordinating work in large on-
line crowds can be particularly difficult for several rea-
sons. Unlike organizational work groups, online crowds of-
ten lack hierarchical structures, formal boundaries, stable
memberships, and formal training (Kittur and Kraut 2010;
Robert and Romero 2015; Keegan, Gergle, and Contractor
2012). Additionally, these crowds are typically composed
of members who work at a distance and rely on electronic
communication (Robert and Romero 2016), which further
increases the prevalence of conflict (Hinds and Bailey 2003;
Windeler et al. 2015; Filippova and Cho 2016). For exam-
ple, Filippova and Cho find that as task interdependence and
geographic dispersion increase, so does conflict in Github
crowds. Kittur and Kraut examine Wikipedia crowds and
find that as crowd size increases coordination becomes more
difficult and conflict increases.
Other studies have focused on identifying ways to reduce
conflict in online crowds. For example, Kittur and Kraut dis-
cover that the positive relationship between crowd size and
conflict diminishes when either communication between ed-
itors increases or crowds centralize their work. Filippova
and Cho find that leadership style and member participation
in the decision-making reduce conflict in Github crowds.
Arazy et al. and Arazy, Yeo, and Nov both find that crowds
with more administrators have less conflict.
This strand of literature offers an important and rich un-
derstanding of conflict and centralization in crowds. How-
ever, it has focused exclusively on conflict constructed un-
der stable and static conditions. In online crowdsourcing
platforms, crowds operate in environments that are far more
chaotic and susceptible to disruptions than traditional orga-
nizational work groups. In this work, we aim to fill this gap
by studying how centralization and conflict levels in collabo-
rative online crowds change as a result of disruptive shocks.
Background
Chinese Wikipedia, the Chinese-language version of
Wikipedia, was established on October 24, 2002. As of
October 2016, Chinese Wikipedia has accumulated over
4.8 million articles, with 43 million revisions contributed
by over 2 million registered users. Aiming to provide a
free online encyclopedia for Chinese-speaking users, Chi-
nese Wikipedia has benefited from contribution by editors
from mainland China (20.9%), Hong Kong (26.3%), Taiwan
(36.9%), the Unites States (5.6%), and Canada (1.9%).1
Due to the censorship of online content by the Great Fire-
wall System of the Chinese government, Chinese Wikipedia
had been blocked massively in mainland China three times
by 2008. These blocks denied users from mainland China
the access to Chinese Wikipedia. The first block took place
on July 2, 2004, and was lifted on July 21, 2004. On
Sep. 23, 2004, the Chinese government issued the second
block, which lasted for 5 days. The third block of Chinese
Wikipedia started on Oct. 19, 2005. Unlike the first two
blocks, both of which lasted for only a short period of time,
this block spanned for almost 1 year and was not lifted until
Oct. 10, 2006 (Zhang and Zhu 2011).
In this study, we focus on the impact of the shocks due
to the third block on the collaborative behavior of editors
of Chinese Wikipedia. There are two reasons for focusing
on the third block. First, it was deployed without any prior
announcement or warning and the Chinese government of-
fered no official explanation afterward. Hence, it serves as an
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese Wikipedia.
exogenous shock largely unexpected by editors of Chinese
Wikipedia. Moreover, unlike the prior two blocks, this block
spanned a relatively long period of time, which allows us to
overcome the difficulty resulting from the overall sparsity of
contribution to Wikipedia.
Identifying Blocked Users
In order to study the effect of the block on collaborative
groups of editors who maintain a specific article, we need
to identify the blocked users. To provide a reliable identi-
fication of the blocked users, we make use of three criteria
to decide whether a specific editor of Chinese Wikipedia is
from mainland China and is therefore blocked during the
censorship period of the third block: editing behavior, lin-
guistic patterns, and temporal patterns.
Editing Behavior: We first restrict the set of Wikipedia ed-
itors to those who made edits before the block. We then in-
spect the edits from these editors to filter out those who made
edits during any of the three blocks – those editors are either
from outside mainland China, and thus unblocked, or have
found methods to circumvent the censorship.
社交媒体
社交媒體
Figure 1: Chinese characters for the word “social media”:
The first line is the simplified Chinese and the second line is
the traditional Chinese.
Linguistic Patterns: Our second check exploits the unique
feature of the linguistic pattern of the Chinese language.
There exist two encoding systems for Chinese language: the
simplified Chinese and the traditional Chinese. Among all
Chinese characters, there are approximately 2,000 for which
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Figure 2: Traditional character usage: The y-axis denotes the
fraction of the editors of Chinese Wikipedia that have x% of
their total characters written in traditional characters
the simplified version differs from the traditional version.
For example, Figure 1 shows the Chinese characters for the
word “social media” in the simplified version (the first line)
and those in the traditional version (the second line). Note
that the two versions share the first three characters, but dif-
fer from each other in the last one. The simplified Chinese is
mainly used in mainland China, whereas the traditional Chi-
nese is mainly used in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. This
feature provides a reliable measure for identifying mainland
China editors, and has been used in related work (Zhang and
Zhu 2011). However, (Zhang and Zhu 2011) define an ed-
itor as non-blocked if more than 50 percent of the editor’s
additions are in traditional Chinese, a threshold that we ulti-
mately find to be arbitrary. In comparison, we identify the
optimal cut-off from the data. To motivate this point fur-
ther, we present in Figure 2: the distribution of editors in
terms of their traditional character usage.2 The plot reveals
a prominent bimodal pattern – editors consistently use ei-
ther traditional or simplified Chinese encoding. In addition,
we observe that the optimal cutoff lies closer to 20%. Next,
we demonstrate that the use of encodings does indeed vary
across different countries in Figure 3. We produce this plot
by considering edits from anonymous users, whose contri-
butions are recorded by their IP addresses instead of user-
names. This set of IP addresses allows us to map these edi-
tors and their use of encoding to their respective countries.3
The editors from mainland China consistently use the sim-
plified version while those from Taiwan and Hong Kong use
the traditional version. Given our results, we classify an ed-
itor as blocked only if 20% or less of the characters used in
their contributions are traditional characters.
Temporal Patterns: While Figure 3 justifies the use of lin-
guistic patterns to identify blocked users, Figure 3(d) also
presents a challenge when considering the U.S. (or other
countries with large Asian expat populations that are not in-
cluded due to space limitations). We observe that while the
U.S. population consists of both editors who use the sim-
plified Chinese and editors that use the traditional Chinese,
most of them use the simplified Chinese. Therefore the en-
coding technique might falsely classify a large number of
editors from the U.S. as being from mainland China, where
simplified encoding is also predominantly used. In an effort
to remove these conflating editors, we also consider the daily
editing patterns of editors from different countries (Figure
4). We find that the editors in the U.S. contribute in differ-
ent time frames from those in mainland China. We observe
the sharpest difference for 18:00-24:00. Based on this find-
ing, we classify an editor as being from mainland China, and
therefore blocked, only if y% or less of their edits are con-
tributed during this time frame.
In summary, we classify editors who pass the first test (de-
scribed in editing behavior), use a traditional character at
most x% of the time, and have at most y% of their edits con-
2In this analysis we ignore characters that have the same repre-
sentation under the two versions.
3Anonymous users account for 78.89% of all editors in our
dataset, whose contribution represents no more than 13% of all re-
visions prior to the third block.
(a) China (b) Hong Kong (c) Taiwan (d) U.S.
Figure 3: Traditional character usage across the four most common countries and areas
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Figure 4: Daily temporal patterns in editing across countries
and areas
tributed during the idle mainland China hours as blocked and
the rest as unblocked.4 Given that we have ground truth for
49,051 editors with IP addresses, we choose the values for
these parameters that maximize the F1 measure when clas-
sifying this population. We find that the optimal x = 0.2 and
y = 1.0. This setting results in recall = 1, precision = 0.74
and F1 = 0.85.
Collaboration and Shock Measures
Our goal is to characterize the effect that the block of Chi-
nese Wikipedia in mainland China has on the dynamics of
collaboration within an article. We consider each article as a
unit of analysis and the set of Wikipedia users who edit the
article as a collaborative crowd or team. We compare activity
during the pre-block period (Oct. 19, 2004, to Oct. 19, 2005)
4We also attempted to differentiate between the truly blocked
users and those who simply dropped out by fitting time lapses
between two edits from a given editor to a Poisson distribution.
Given the fitted distribution, we determine the likelihood of an ed-
itor to make a contribution during the block and identify an editor
as blocked only if the likelihood of edit was above a threshold.
This method does not improve the accuracy and therefore was not
included in our final analysis.
and post-block period (Oct. 19, 2005, to Oct. 19, 2006). Be-
cause the number of editors and type of editors affected by
the block varies across articles, we analyze the relationship
between the fraction of edits made by blocked editors in an
article and impact on three collaboration measures: level of
activity, centralization of workload, and conflict. We now
define these measures precisely.
Shock Level: Given an article a, we define the weighted
blocked ratio Ba of article a as the fraction of edits con-
tributed by the editors blocked among all the edits during
the pre-block period. This measure quantifies the intensity
of the shock caused by the block on an article.
Level of Activity: We first consider the effect that the block
has on editing volume. For each article a, we let EV prea and
EV posta be the number of edits of a made during the pre-block
period and post-block period, respectively. We then measure
the relative change in number of edits as EV∆a = (EV
post
a −
EV prea )/EV
pre
a . Because collaborative crowds lose members
due to the block, we intuitively expect a decrease in the total
number of edits after the block. Previous literature suggests,
however, that efforts to compensate for shock can perhaps
prove effective (Kamphuis, Gaillard, and Vogelaar 2011;
Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003). Thus, while it is unclear how the
block may impact levels of activity, it is even less clear how
activity levels interact with weighted blocked ratio.
Centralization: It is common for Wikipedia articles to have
a skewed distribution of editors’ contributions (Romero,
Huttenlocher, and Kleinberg 2015). Centralization is a form
of coordination, where a few editors take charge of the ma-
jority of the work and rely on a large number of peripheral
users to take on minor tasks, and make the crowd more effec-
tive by reducing the cost of explicit coordination (Kittur and
Kraut 2008). Meanwhile, a centralized article is less likely
to be exposed to diverse expertise and points of view, which
could limit the quality of the crowd’s output (Arazy, Morgan,
and Patterson 2006). Overall, centralization can have an im-
portant impact on the coordination dynamics of the crowd
and on the quality of its output.
To measure centralization, we use the Gini coefficient, a
statistical measure of dispersion to quantify the level of in-
equality in a distribution (Dorfman 1979). We let Eprea and
Eposta be the set of editors of article a in the pre-block and
post-block period, respectively, and Nprea and N
post
a be the
number of editors in Eprea and E
post
a . We let W
pre
a (e) and
W posta (e) be the number of times editor e contributed to arti-
cle a in the respective time periods. We begin by computing
the Gprea , the Gini coefficient of the set {∪e∈Eprea W
pre
a (e)}:
Gprea =
∑i∈Eprea ∑ j∈Eprea |ei− e j|
2∑i∈Eprea ∑ j∈Eprea e j
For example, an article where every editor contributes the
same number of edits has a Gini coefficient of 0, whereas
an article with five editors who contribute 1 edit and one
editor who contributes 20 edits has a Gini coefficient of 0.63.
We calculate the corresponding Gini coefficient for the post-
block period similarly.
Because the value of Gini coefficient depends on the num-
ber of editors and edits in the article, we normalize Gprea and
Gposta by their maximum possible values given the number of
editors and edits in article a during the period for which we
are calculating. We define the centralization of article a dur-
ing the pre-block period, Cprea , as the fraction of G
pre
a and the
maximum value of Ga given E
pre
a and EV
pre
a . We also define
the corresponding measures of centralization of an article
during the post-block period in the same manner. Finally,
we define the change in centralization as C∆a =C
post
a −Cprea .
Conflict: Wikipedia editors have access to a feature
known as reverting that allows them to undo any other edit.
When editors have disagreements with one another, they
often engage in “edit wars”, where they repeatedly revert
one another’s edits (Viegas et al. 2007; Tsvetkova, Garcı´a-
Gavilanes, and Yasseri 2016). We use the fraction of edits
that are reverts as a measure of conflict in an article during
a given time period. We let Rprea and R
post
a be the number of
reverts in article a in the pre-block and post-block periods,
respectively. We define the change in conflict in an article as
R∆a = R
post
a −Rprea .
Results
Here we present the results of our analysis on the change in
activity, centralization, and conflict due to the block. For all
subsequent analysis, we only consider articles with at least
two editors before the block, as our goal is to understand
how crowds respond to unexpected shocks. In addition, for
all three measures we distinguish between the articles that
have no editors from mainland China before the block from
the articles that have at least one. These two populations are
qualitatively different in important ways – the former group
does not appeal to a specific culture (mainland China). In-
deed, articles from these two groups exhibit pre-block differ-
ence in characteristics that are relevant to our study. The ar-
ticles that have at least one editor blocked have 9.06 editors
contributing 19.50 revisions on average before the block,
while those with no editors blocked have 4.45 editors con-
tributing 9.29 revisions on average. In addition, the articles
with at least one blocked editor tend to be contentious, on av-
erage exhibiting roughly a 50% increase in rate of reverting
compared to the group of articles with no blocked editors.
Given these pre-block differences between the articles
with and without any of their editors blocked, we provide
two steps of analysis for each of our three measures. First,
we compare the change in behavior between the articles with
no editors blocked and the articles with at least one editor
blocked. This allows us to understand whether being ex-
posed to the shock, regardless of its level, has an effect on
the articles. In total, we have 49,945 articles in our dataset
and 27,856 among them have no editors blocked. Then, we
examine how variations in the shock level affect articles that
have at least one editor blocked. In short, we find that the
shock negatively affects activity within groups, and that our
findings for centralization and conflict are in agreement with
literature on threat rigidity theory.
Activity
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the relative level of
activity. An average article has a 29% decrease in the level of
activity, with the standard deviation of 1.044. We first com-
pare the level of activity between articles with no editors
blocked and those with at least one editor blocked. To this
end, we regress the relative change in number of revisions of
an article (EV∆a ) over a dummy variable indicating whether
or not the article has at least one editor blocked, denoted by
IBlocka , controlling for the number of editors, denoted by N
pre
a .
EV∆a = β0 +β1I
Block
a +β2N
pre
a + εa (1)
Table 2 presents the result for regression 1. We see that ar-
ticles on average become less active after the block, with a
nearly 30% decrease in the number of revisions. This might
be explained by the reduction in the number of readers,
which reduces individuals’ incentives to contribute to the
public good (Zhang and Zhu 2011). Specifically, the volume
of revisions for articles with no editor from mainland China
shrinks by nearly 37%. Compared with that, articles with
at least one editor blocked experience an additional 3% de-
crease (statistically significant at the 5% level), which leads
to a total 40% decline in activity.5
Next, we examine the impact of various shock levels on
the relative changes in activity across articles. To this end,
we regress the relative change in number of revisions over
the shock level (weighted blocked ratio) denoted by Ba, con-
trolling for the number of editors before the block Nprea .
EV∆a = f (Ba)+βN
pre
a + εa (2)
In Table 3, we report the regression results using both the lin-
ear specification and the quadratic specification for f (Ba).6
To compare the fitness of the two models, for each spec-
ification we perform a likelihood ratio (LR) test of the
quadratic model against the linear model. This shows that
the quadratic model does not provide a significantly better
fit to the change in activity than the linear model does.
Figure 5(a) illustrates the relative change in activity due
to various levels of shocks. The blue line plots the relative
change in number of revisions as well as the error bars de-
noting 1.96 standard error above and below the mean. The
5The variance inflation factor of the regression is 1.1, which in-
dicates that the potential collinearity between the number of editors
before the block and whether an article has any editor blocked does
not severely affect the variance of the estimated coefficients.
6Controlling for lifetime of articles in the regressions does not
qualitatively affect the results.
mean min max std.dev skewness
Activity -0.2927 -1.0000 46.2857 1.0440 11.9280
Centralization -0.0522 -1.0000 1.0000 0.2169 0.2739
Conflict -0.0235 -0.6667 0.5000 0.1004 0.1827
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the collaboration measures.
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Figure 5: Change in editing volume as a function of shock level: The blue curve denotes the average EV∆a within articles that
were exposed to the shock level provided in the x axis. 1.96 standard errors are plotted for each point. The green hyphens
indicate the regression fit without controlling for number of editors and the red dashes indicate the regression fit with control.
red line and the green line represent the regression results
with and without the number of editors before the block as a
control. Hence, the discrepancy between the two regression
lines illustrates how much of the change in articles’ behavior
is a result of the size of the crowd. We see from figure 5(a)
that articles subject to a higher level of shock experience a
larger decrease in activity. Specifically, the regression results
show that a 10% loss in number of editors leads to a nearly
7.5% decline in volume of revisions for an average article.
We further separate the analysis between small crowds with
at most 5 editors (Figure 5(b)) and large crowds with over
5 editors (Figure 5(c)). Although the shock level still has
a significant impact on both types of crowds, it appears to
affect large crowds more substantially. Articles with more
than 5 editors before the block exhibit non-linear decreases
in number of revisions, whereas those with at most 5 editors
respond to the shock in a linear way. Specifically, when the
shock level is below 0.45, articles with more than 5 editors
experience smaller changes in activity than those with no
more than 5 editors do. When the shock level exceeds 0.45,
the change in activity decreases faster in articles with more
than 5 editors than those with less than 5 editors. This sug-
gests that the vulnerability of a crowd to shocks depends on
the size of the crowd. When the shock level is low, a large
crowd is resilient toward it. However, beyond the threshold
of 0.45, as the shock level increases, the change in the effect
of a shock on activity level is more severe for large crowds.
Centralization
We regress the change in centralization C∆a over the indicator
variable IBlocka controlling for the number of editors:
C∆a = β0 +β1I
Block
a +β2N
pre
a + εa (3)
Activity Centralization Conflict
Nprea 0.0119∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0001)
IBlock -0.0319∗∗ 0.0007 -0.0474∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0029) (0.0030)
constant -0.3691∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗ 0.0253∗∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0018) 0.0024
The standard errors of the parameter estimates are
provided in parentheses. ∗∗∗and ∗∗denote signifi-
cance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
Table 2: Regressions of (relative) change in activity, cen-
tralization and conflict over the dummy variable indicat-
ing whether an article has at least one editor blocked.
We find that the coefficient β1 is not significantly differ-
ent from zero, suggesting that there is no difference in the
change in centralization between the two types of articles. To
further investigate how the level of shock, Ba, relates to the
changes in centralization of articles with at least one editor
blocked, we regress C∆a over the shock level, Ba, controlling
for the number of editors in the pre-block period:
C∆a = f (Ba)+βN
pre
a + εa (4)
We fit both the linear and the quadratic models in the re-
gression, and find that the quadratic one provides a signifi-
cantly better fit than the linear model according to the likeli-
hood ratio test (p-value < 0.01%).
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between C∆a and Ba
for all articles (a), articles with a small number of editors
Activity Centralization Conflict
Epre 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
B -0.7471∗∗∗ -0.7463∗∗∗ 0.1116∗∗∗ 0.3916∗∗∗ 0.0013 -0.2699∗∗∗
(0.0478) (0.1472) (0.0108) (0.0327) (0.0105) (0.0293)
B2 - -0.0011 - -0.3898∗∗∗ - 0.4430∗∗∗
(0.1900) (0.0430) (0.0448)
χ2(1)† 0.00 81.95 96.69
LR test†† 0.9954 0.0000 0.0000
† Reports the test statistics for the likelihood ratio test.
†† Reports the p-value for the likelihood ratio test.
For each measure, the left column represents the result from the linear regression and the right
column represents that from the quadratic regression. The standard errors of the parameter
estimates are provided in parentheses. ∗∗∗denotes significance at 1%.
Table 3: Regressions of the collaboration measures.
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Figure 6: Change in centralization as a function of shock level.
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Figure 7: Change in composition as a function of shock lev-
els.
(b), and articles with a large number of editors (c). We find
a consistent inverse U-shaped pattern – that the change in
centralization tends to increase with the shock level initially
but decrease afterward. Using a back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lation based on the parameter estimates for the regression
results in Table 3, we find that the break-point at which the
change in centralization begins to decrease is consistently
around the point where Ba = 0.5 for the three sets of articles
shown in Figure 6.7
The initial increase in centralization is consistent with
the threat rigidity theory, which suggests that when groups
have a perceived threat they become more centralized. So
what explains the change in behavior beyond Ba = 0.5? We
present the reasoning below.
We now investigate the change in composition of a group
– in terms of new versus old editors – as a function of the
shock level. We let Compprea and Comp
post
a be the number
of editors who were active during the post-block period and
who edited article a for the first time during the pre-block
period and post-block period, respectively. We then measure
the fraction of new editors during the post-block period for
an article a as Compa =
Compposta
Compposta +Comp
pre
a
. In Figure 7, we
7The break point is given by −βB/2βB2 .
show how this measure varies across articles with different
shock levels. The x-axis in this figure denotes the shock level
and the y-axis denotes the fraction of new users (Compa).
We provide boxplots and means (diamond shape) for articles
of varying shock levels. The red line and the green line are
defined in the same manner as in the analysis of activity. The
results show that as the shock level increases, the composi-
tion of a group post-block tends to include more new editors.
This suggests that for the high shock levels, the composition
of a group tends to be dominated by editors who joined the
group later and therefore did not experience the shock. In
fact, for Ba >= 0.5, the majority of editors for more than
half of the articles are new to the group.
Given the finding on compositional effects, the break
point in Figure 6 is now easier to interpret. As we move
beyond Ba ≥ 0.5, for instance, the majority of a group con-
sists of users who joined the article after the shock and thus
did not experience the shock. It is natural that for such ar-
ticles, the changes in concentration are not as strong as in
the cases where most group members experienced the shock
and hence behave according to threat rigidity theory.
Conflict
We analyze conflict by comparing articles with and without
editors blocked in the following regression:
R∆a = β0 +β1I
Block
a +β2N
pre
a + εa (5)
We find that articles with at least one editor blocked expe-
rience a 2.2% drop in conflict, while those with no editors
blocked experience a 2.5% increase in conflict. Given that
articles with no editors blocked are not directly affected by
the shock, this poses a conundrum. However, this can be
explained once the trend of conflict is estimated during the
pre-block period. Indeed, we find that articles with no edi-
tors blocked already experience a 2.5% increase when com-
paring time periods October 2004-May 2005 to May 2005-
October 2005, while those with at least one editor blocked
experience < 0.001% change in the same time period. This
shows that the trend in conflict is unchanged for articles
with no editors blocked, while those with at least one edi-
tor blocked shifts from constant conflict to a decreasing one.
Next, we examine the effect of the shock level on conflict
in articles. To that end, we regress the amount of conflict of
an article to the weighted ratio of blocked editors, control-
ling for the number of editors as follows:
R∆a = f (Ba)+βN
pre
a + εa (6)
Here, we consider articles that had at least one revert either
one year before or after the block as this limits the analysis to
articles with editors who are aware of the reverting feature.
The results are consistent with the overall qualitative find-
ings if all articles are included. Note that we also evaluated
the fit of a linear model and find that the quadratic model
provides a significantly better fit for the data given the like-
lihood ratio test (p-value < 0.01%). The findings presented
in Figure 8 are intriguing. We observe that for both small
and large articles, small shocks result in a decrease in con-
flict. This finding is in agreement with threat rigidity theory,
B2 B
Direct Effect 0.4222∗∗∗ -0.2471∗∗∗
(0.0448) (0.0295)
Indirect Effect 0.0012 -0.0011
(0.0035) (0.0035)
Total Effect 0.4234∗∗∗ -0.2482∗∗∗
(0.0446) (0.0293)
Table 4: Results from the mediation analysis. The standard
errors of the parameter estimates are provided in parenthe-
ses. ∗∗∗denotes p-value < 0.01 respectively.
which suggests that when groups face an external threat they
become more cohesive and hence exhibit less conflict (Staw,
Sandelands, and Dutton 1981).
Moving from small to big shocks, we find an inflection
point – after around Ba > 0.3, a larger blocked ratio results
in a smaller reduction in conflict. As shown in the analysis
of centralization, when large shocks occur, most of the cur-
rent group members disappear and the new composition of
the team consists of new group members. Thus, the increase
in the change in conflict when Ba is large is likely due to the
fact that most group members in these cases did not experi-
ence the shock.
Mediation Analysis
Centralization and conflict are likely to relate to each other.
When a group is highly centralized, explicit coordination
is less costly and it is easier to complete tasks without en-
gaging in conflict (Kittur and Kraut 2010). We observe that
shock level had the opposite relationship with centralization
than it does with conflict. Indeed, controlling for the shock
level and the number of editors, we find a negative and sig-
nificant relationship between centralization and conflict. It
is possible that the shock affects conflict indirectly through
its impact on centralization. To separate out the direct ef-
fect of weighted blocked ratio on conflict and any indirect
effect through centralization, we conduct a mediation analy-
sis (MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz 2007) among weighted
blocked ratio, centralization, and conflict.
Figure 9 shows the model and Table 4 summarizes the
decomposition of the direct effect and the indirect effect
from the mediation analysis. The only significant effect that
weighted blocked ratio has on conflict is the direct effect and
there is no significant indirect effect through concentration.
Indeed, the direct effect accounts for over 99% of the total
effect that the weighted blocked ratio has on conflict. This
suggests that while centralization directly impacts conflict,
the observed non-linear effect that weighted blocked ratio
has on conflict is independent of the effect of centralization.
Discussion
Through this research we seek to understand the impact of
external shocks on crowds. To do so, we examine the 2005
Chinese government censorship of Wikipedia. Results from
our analysis provide four overarching findings, which have
implications for research and design.
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Figure 8: Change in conflict as a function of shock level.
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Figure 9: Mediation analysis diagram
First, group size matters. Although size is not a key ele-
ment in the threat rigidity literature on groups, it had an im-
portant role in our study. Larger crowds were able to main-
tain similar levels of activity when they experienced mod-
erate shocks. Smaller crowds experienced more dramatic
drop-offs in their level of activity. This supports the idea
of resiliency through size. However, the opposite was true
when shocks were more severe. For severe shocks, smaller
crowds experienced smaller decreases in their level of activ-
ity, while larger crowds had dramatic drop-offs in their ac-
tivity. The importance of size in understanding how groups
respond to shocks may have been de-emphasized in prior
literature, which did not significantly vary group size. How-
ever, our results suggest that size is vital to understanding
how groups respond to threats.
Second, in the context of crowds the impact of shocks on
centralization and conflict is not as straightforward as the lit-
erature suggests. Surprisingly, moderate shocks had a much
more profound and lasting impact than severe shocks. In
cases of severe shocks large portions of the crowd were lost
and later replaced with newcomers. The greater the influx of
newcomers into the crowd, the less the crowd displayed evi-
dence of the shock. More specifically, these crowds are more
decentralized and have more conflict compared to crowds
that experience more moderate shocks and retain more of
their previous members. Newcomers did not experience the
shock and are likely to be less willing to support increases in
centralization and decreases in conflict. Although this find-
ing is novel, it is unclear whether it only applies to crowds
or it could generalize to other settings.
Third, this study extends research on threat rigidity to in-
clude a large-scale validation in the context of online groups.
As predicted by threat rigidity, crowds become more cen-
tralized and conflict decreased after those crowds experi-
ence a moderate shock. The fact that these are real groups
and face a genuine threat may explain why our findings
support threat rigidity while some prior studies do not (Ar-
gote, Turner, and Fichman 1989; Gladstein and Reilly 1985;
Harrington, Lemak, and Kendall 2002). We also find that
threat rigidity in the context of crowds appears to be much
more complex than what we would expect to find in tradi-
tional groups. Nonetheless, this study presents a distinct op-
portunity to extend the research on threat rigidity in a more
natural setting.
Finally, the results of this study have implications for de-
sign. The literature on threat rigidity suggests that there is
not one correct way for groups to respond to a shock. There-
fore, systems should be designed to support sudden changes
because these are likely to fluctuate with exogenous shocks.
Results of our study demonstrate that crowd size, the sever-
ity of the shock, and the availability of newcomers are key
factors that designers have to consider when designing sys-
tems to support crowds.
Compared to other groups, crowds operate in uniquely
volatile environments where coordination is difficult and
conflict is probable. We examine the impact of an external
shock on crowds by analyzing the effects of the 2005 Chi-
nese government block of Chinese Wikipedia. This event
provides a natural experiment that allows us to systemat-
ically analyze the effects of a real external shock on real
crowds. We find compelling evidence that both generally
supports threat rigidity and contextualizes it to crowds. Our
findings can help to inform both theory and design of crowd-
sourcing systems.
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